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THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND SELF
Stephen L. Carter·
A MONG the most hallowed precepts of American constitutional lawis that the First Amendment builds a wall of separation betweenchurch and state. I As many theorists have noted, however, the
existence of this metaphorical wall raises the question of how a public-spir-
ited citizen who is also religiously devout should conduct her affairs. In
particular, if the citizen participates in a faith with a tradition of making
demands on the citizen's conscience, how does the individual translate those
demands into the secular political realm without breaching the wall?2
The modem theorists of liberalism have either elided this question, by
treating religion as one of the many prejudices that the citizen should cast
aside, or thought the answer obvious, by insisting that religious dialogue has
no place in the public square. The first approach is exemplified by the phi-
losopher John Rawls, whose suggestion that principles of justice be derived
from a hypothetical original position, behind a veil of ignorance about the
characteristics one will have in the real world,3 has been the subject of criti-
cism on the ground that many people cherish the very characteristics Rawls
wishes to discard.4 The second approach is exemplified by my friend and
colleague Bruce Ackerman, who dismisses from liberal dialogue arguments
• William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. This article served as
the basis of the Roy Ray Lecture, delivered at the Southern Methodist University School of
Law, March 24, 1992. Many of these ideas are developed in more detail in STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (forthcoming 1993).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge,
Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association in
the State of Connecticut (Jan. I, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82
(1904). Regarding the Bill of Rights, Jefferson stated he believed the First Amendment "built
a wall of separation between Church and State." [d.
2. For a recent provocative stab at answering this question, see MICHAEL J. PERRY,
LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991). Other recent works include KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1986); Robert Audi, The Separation o/Church and State and the Obligations o/Citizenship, 18
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
3. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971).
4. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 229-34(1981) (notes that people
can never really exist behind Rawl's veil of ignorance); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 24-27 (1982) (argues that Rawl's veil of ignorance "excludes
morally relevant information . . . necessary to generate any meaningful results"); see also
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77
CAL L. REV. 521, 531 (1989) (argues that "the case for bracketing a particular moral or reli-
gious controversy may partly depend on an implicit answer to the controversy it purports to
bracket").
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stated in religious terms because they are non-verifiable and non-neutral,S
and whose views have been criticized on the ground that they require citi-
zens to shut off vital components of their personalities in order to retain
access to the public square.6
These otherwise admirable liberal theories simply fail to come to grips
with the importance of religion as a facet of the human personality - or, at
least, a facet of the personalities of many millions of humans. 7 The implica-
tion of these theories is that a religion is in some sense an arbitrary choice
(perhaps an illiberal one at that), is not a fundament of personality, and is a
choice that should not be respected in modeling the ideal public citizen. The
vision of the public square that modem liberal theory seems to embrace is
one in which citizens leave such impedimenta behind them when they enter.
I have elsewhere described the proposition that ideal citizens are not moti-
vated in their political selves by religious devotion as tending to trivialize
religion.s Still, in an admittedly un-Kantian way, I have not heretofore con-
sidered the idea very dangerous because it has remained a theoretical con-
struct rather than a model for solving practical problems. But this
disturbing image of the ideal public citizen as leaving religion behind when
entering the public square has increasingly found its way out of the academy
and into American law and politics.
In this article, I will explore this image, which I call the separation of
church and self,9 through brief discussions of three contemporary problems,
each of them a model of a separation dilemma: the role of religious groups
in the pro-life movement, which exemplifies the problem of religious support
for so-called "moral" legislation; 10 the role of religious belief in the anti-
evolution movement, which exemplifies the problem of religious support for
"empirical" legislation; II and the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the
Smith 12 and Lyng 13 cases, which exemplify the problem of government pres-
5. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 110-11.
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 55-73 (1988) [herein-
after PERRY, MORALITY]; MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION
AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1-28 (1991) [hereinafter PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER].
7. The estimated religious population of the world as of mid-1990 was 5,292,178,000.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1992725 (1992).
8. See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932
(1989) [hereinafter Carter, Devout Judge]; Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism. Creationism. and
Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977 (1987) [hereinafter Carter, Religion as a
Hobby].
9. My choice of terminology is influenced by Michael Perry's metaphor of the religious
self in liberal theory as bracketed from the rest of the personality. See PERRY, MORALITY
supra note 6, at 121-79, 180-84. Perry explores some of the implications of this metaphor
(which he rejects, as I do) in his more recent book, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELI-
GION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1-28 & 139-45 (1991).
10. See infra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
12. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see infra
notes 57-68 and accompanying text for discussion of case.
13. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see infra
notes 71-75 and accompanying text for discussion of case.
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sure not to undertake certain religious practices. 14 It is not my intention in
discussing the religious dimension to suggest the right answers to any of the
underlying moral problems; I only hope to complexify them, to demonstrate
that the problems of separation of church and self are more subtle than lib-
eral dialogue usually admits.
Unquestionably, American pluralist democracy requires a vivid separation
of church and state. But if the separation of church and state is understood
as a doctrine prohibiting the government from endorsing a religion's claims
or penalizing or encouraging membership, it is difficult to understand why
that separation must go further and actually seek to exclude from the public
square those to whom religion is important in forming their personal moral
consciences. I have argued elsewhere that liberal democracy should be un-
concerned with how individual conscience is formed, and equally uncon-
cerned with how individuals, in dialogue with one another, justify their
moral positions. IS Even if one enforces a dialogic rule that limits how the
state as an entity may justify its choices, that rule should not be one that
prevents the state from listening to those whose appeals are openly and ex-
plicitly religious in nature - or from allowing such citizens to prevail in
trying to enact secular legislation, if they can but convince other citizens of
the wisdom of their positions.
In all of this, I will point to the importance of preserving, or perhaps
restoring, a sense of religious autonomy. I have in mind the role of religions
as independent entities, not part of or subject to control by the state. The
religions, in this vision, become sources of power and sovereignty, making
demands on the loyalty of adherents, thus effectively splitting the duties of
citizens between these different masters. The religious citizen, then, is ut-
terly loyal to the state, but is utterly loyal as well to another entity with its
own teaching about a life well lived.
All of this should seem very simple. Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, the
need for and value of autonomous religious institutions undergirds all the
plausible arguments for religious freedom, and many conceptions of democ-
racy,16 And yet, I shall suggest, our legal and political cultures have in re-
cent years embarked upon a quite serious attack on this understanding of
religion - an attack born less out of a willed hostility to religion than out of
14. The public lecture on which this paper is based included a brief discussion of a fourth
example: the recent dispute in New York City over the refusal by those in charge of the St.
Patrick's Day parade to allow participation by groups of openly gay and lesbian marchers,
which I described as exemplifying the problem of applying external moral standards to the
internal organization of religious groups. The basic point of the argument, to which I continue
to subscribe, was that although discrimination on the basis of sexual preference is wrong and
should be prohibited in the market, religious groups should remain free to discriminate in
some circumstances without government penalty. Autonomy of this kind, I contended, is cru-
cial to the role of religion as an independent moral authority in a democratic society. How-
ever, because I am no longer satisfied with all of the details of the argument, I have omitted it
from the published version of the lecture.
15. See Carter, Devout Judge, supra note 8, at 943-44; Stephen L. Carter, Does the First
Amendment Protect More Than Free Speech?, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 886-87 (1992).
16. See CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (forthcoming in 1993).
HeinOnline -- 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 588 1992-1993
588 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
a liberal politics to which religious devotion is more and more considered a
threat.
I. PROBLEM 1 - "MORAL" LEGISLAnON
There is an article of public liberal faith holding that it is wrong for the
state to impose anybody's morality on anybody else. Nobody, of course,
actually believes this; it is not possible to imagine a law of any kind that
constitutes anything but a moral judgment, backed with the power of the
state. Still, the notion that it is wrong to impose morality is a regular feature
of our national political dialogue. And it is in the debate, the one over the
imposition of morality, that the American attitudes that threaten religious
autonomy are perhaps most sharply etched.
Everybody's political bugaboo, it seems, is abortion, and nowhere is the
separation of church and state less understood, on both sides. On the one
hand, there are some in the pro-life movement who seem to think that the
purpose of secular politics is to transform America into a nation reflecting,
in all of its laws and values, a particular set of religious traditions. On the
other, there are many in the pro-choice movement who seem to think that
the fact that many pro-lifers are religiously motivated automatically gives
pro-choicers the moral and constitutional high ground. Neither of these vi-
sions is particularly appealing in a nation dedicated to the separation of
church and state.
Although the vision of America as a country that should reflect in its laws
a particular religious tradition is dangerous and oppressive, I have discussed
it elsewhere and will not repeat the reasons here,17 I have also discussed
elsewhere the reasons that liberalism errs grievously if it attempts to wall off
the religious facet of human personality as a justification for action in the
public square. 18
I do want to take a moment, however, to note an analogy that occasion-
ally creeps into the literature and that deserves more thorough discussion.
The analogy I have in mind is between the role of religion in the pro-life
movement and the role of religion in the civil rights movement.
Let me state at the outset that an analogy is not an identity. By discussing
the civil rights movement alongside the pro-life movement, I do not mean to
imply that the goals are of similar weight or that the tactics or rhetoric are
comparable. I emphatically do not mean to suggest that the mean-spirited-
ness of some in the pro-life movement compares in any way with the self-
sacrificing idealism of the civil rights movements. 19 I claim only that some
of the criticisms of the role of religion in the pro-life movement would seem,
in their breadth, to apply equally to the civil rights movement.
The battle for racial equality - what the historian Clayborne Carson has
17. See Carter, The Devout Judge, supra note 8, at 940-41.
18. See Carter, Religion as a Hobby, supra note 8, at 978; Stephen L. Carter, The Inaugu-
ral Development Fund Lectures: Scientific Liberalism. Scientistic Law, 69 OR. L. REV. 483
(1990).
19. There are, to be sure, self-sacrificing idealists in the pro-life movement as well.
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called the black freedom struggle20 - was a mass movement, fought on a
number of fronts, including the political and the legal. It had no central
axis, that is, there was no joint leadership committee allocating this much
energy to litigation and this much energy to protest. And yet, the move-
ment's support base for much of its existence was in the church. The leaders
of the mass-protest wing were drawn from the black clergy, which continues
to supply a disproportionate share of the civil rights leadership. The move-
ment's public appeals were openly and frankly religious, and many of the
nation's political leaders joined in these appeals, and everi echoed them in
supporting legislation.21
Now, suppose that the time line of liberalism were to shift a bit. Suppose
that Roe v. Wode 22 had been decided in 1954, and we were now struggling
over the implications of a series of desegregation decisions that began in the
late seventies. Had the nation been forced to confront the abortion issue
prior to the issue of racial equality, and had religious groups taken the lead
in an earlier pro-life movement, it is hard to imagine that a religiously based
civil rights movement could get a foot in the liberal door.23
Consider, for example, Martin Luther King Jr.'s "Letter from Birming-
ham City Jail," which is often extolled as an outstanding work of justifica-
tion for civil disobedience, but which is an overtly and unapologetically
religious document.24 The Letter's explicit appeal to a higher authority was
an appeal to King's own conception of God. If there is any doubt that the
Movement was religious, consider the fact that its leader was a member of
the clergy - nowadays, a symbol sure to raise a degree of ire, but then, a
matter raising no liberal concerns. Indeed, when the Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop of New Orleans declared racial segregation a sin in the late fifties,
explicitly forbidding Catholic legislators to support it, liberals applauded,
and only rabid segregationists attacked what in today's terms would doubt-
less be considered a breach of the wall of separation between church and
state. Indeed, at all its most dramatic moments, from King's "Letter" to the
Montgomery bus boycott in the fifties and King's "I Have a Dream" speech
in 1963,25 the Movement's leaders spoke openly of the commands of God as
20. CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE
19608,23-40 (1982) (discussing conflicts ofthe Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).
21. Mary Ann Glendon, Notes on the Culture Struggle: Dr. King in the Law Schools,
FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1990, at 9.
22. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
23. One might argue, of course, that religion was simply a camouflage in the civil rights
movement, and that had religious arguments not been available, something else would have
been used. Although I have no doubt that another rhetorical choice might have been available
(and would have been used, had the separation of church and self then existed), there is little
room for doubt that the religious appeals were both sincere and, to adherents, quite
compelling.
24. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, (Apr. 16, 1963), in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE EsSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 289-302
(James M. Washington ed., 1986).
25. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE EssEN-
TIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING., JR., supra note 24, at 217.
HeinOnline -- 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 590 1992-1993
590 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
a crucial basis for their public activism. Thus, they made no serious effort to
disguise their true intention: to impose their religious beliefs on others.
Nowadays, of course, the idea of "imposing" religious beliefs is an accusa-
tion - something against which it is thought necessary for partisans to de-
fend themselves. As a rhetorical choice, to limit the possibility of religious
oppression, this approach is easy to understand, and probably sensible as
well. At the same time, it is profoundly unrealistic. The state inevitably
makes moral judgments (What should be the penalty for murder? Should
the wearing of seat belts be encouraged? Should flood victims receive foreign
aid?), and that is to the good. The Establishment Clause doubtless means
that the state cannot explicitly base its laws on prevailing religious belief.26
But the considered moral judgments of citizens are often (if we believe the
surveys, usually, and, in the case of the Congress, almost always) informed
by religious belief. Consequently, whatever strictures one might want to
place on the actual decision-making process, one cannot exclude from the
debate those whose consciences are formed in part by religion unless one
wants to restrict debate to an unrepresentative agnostic elite.
In the particular case of the abortion debate, it should be plain that there
is no escape from the imposition of morality. A pro-life statute enforces a
moral regime on pregnant women; a pro-choice statute enforces a moral re-
gime on fetuses. True, one might want to argue that fetuses don't matter, so
that we needn't care what is forced upon them, but that argument simply
assumes what is to be proved. It is frequently said - even, implicitly, by a
very wise Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Paul Stevens -
that choosing to treat the fetus as a person is an inherently religious deci-
sion.27 This claim does not seem quite empirically accurate - there are
atheists and agnostics aplenty in the pro-life movement - but that is not
quite the point. Rather, if the question of what constitutes personhood is an
inherently religious one, there is no escape from that inherentness by giving
a particular answer. In other words, if the decision that the fetus is a person
is inherently religious, so is the decision that the fetus is not. To say that
every woman should thus make the choice for herself has the style of a brisk,
practical solution, and might even be the right one. But assigning the deci-
sion on fetal personhood to the woman says only that the state declines to
make it, and if the state declines to make it, the state is declining to treat the
fetus as a person - which is, according to the logic of Justice Stevens's
position, a religious decision that the state is barred from making.
This conundrum is not difficult to resolve. Constitutional rights should be
cast in positive, not negative terms: what should matter is the source of the
right, not the motivation of those who want to take it away. Thus, the claim
that the right to privacy is broad enough to encompass abortion, if it is to be
defended, should be defended on its own terms, rather than on the basis of
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 565-68 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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what forces motivate some opponents.28 The argument must be pressed that
the right stems from this clause, understood in that way - for if there is no
pre-existing right, then there is nothing available for religiously motivated
opponents to take.
The Supreme Court misses this point regularly. The majority missed it
badly in Edwards v. Aguillard,29 with the unfortunate suggestion that the
unconstitutionality of a law requiring schools to teach scientific creationism
turns on a showing that some of the supporters were religiously motivated30
- a suggestion that would also render unconstitutional the religiously moti-
vated teaching of evolution. The result in Edwards is correct, but not be-
cause of the Court's discussion of what is in the minds of the supporters of
the laws.
Still, at least the Edwards approach is consistent with what the Justices
have done elsewhere, even though what they have done elsewhere has led to
troubling consequences. In particular, the notion that the content of a right
varies depending upon what is in the minds of those who would do harm has
been something of a setback to efforts to use the Constitution as a shield
against racial discrimination.31 Dressed up as a requirement that "discrimi-
natory motive" be shown before a violation will be found,32 this approach
makes mock of the idea that the Constitution protects individuals against
particular acts - instead, the Court seems to think, the Constitution, like a
criminal code, protects individuals against particular guilty minds.
The definition of life is not appreciably different. For many people, the
question might indeed be a religious one. But that does not free the state
from the obligation to define life. In the absence of a definition of life, in-
cluding its beginning and its end, the state could neither take a census nor
prosecute murder. Indeed, liberalism itself requires a definition of the
human, for in liberal theory, rights attach to individuals. If one needs a
theology to determine what a human being is, and if that need is itself a
disqualification under the Establishment Clause, then liberalism becomes a
constitutionally impermissible theory of justice.
I do not mean, however, to seem anti-liberal; I just wish that less of mod-
28. Indeed, even privacy may not be the right ground. I have argued elsewhere that the
privacy rationale for Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is shaky and perhaps even contradic-
tory, and that the sex equality argument might be stronger. See Stephen L. Carter, Abortion.
Absolutism, and Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 2747 (1991). For an example of the sex equality
defense of abortion rights, see CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIS-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93-104 (1987).
29. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
30. Id. at 580.
31. Randall Kennedy has suggested that the Court's decisions restricting Fourteenth
Amendment violations to cases of discriminatory intent have preserved the anti-discrimination
edifice of the Warren Court, which outlawed purposeful discrimination by government entities.
Randall Kennedy, Indiscriminate Indictments, TIKKUN, May-June 1992, 37,43.
32. See Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that plaintiffs must prove defend-
ants acted with racially discriminatory motive to prevail under a Fifteenth Amendment claim);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs must prove defendants acted with racially
discriminatory motive to prevail under a Fourteenth Amendment claim).
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em liberalism seemed so anti-religious. For if a citizen is told that access to
the public square is available on a privileged basis to those fortunate enough
to have reasoned their way to moral conclusions without benefit of religious
consideration (precious few Americans), then it truly is demanding, even
before the conversation begins, a separation of church and self.
II. PROBLEM 2 - "EMPIRICAL" LEGISLAnON
Some pro-life legislative initiatives involve an explicit effort to define
human life - the so-called "Human Life Bill"33 is perhaps the best
known. 34 Such legislation, although obviously in some sense "moral," might
also be considered "empirical" because it is written as though reflecting a
scientific judgment.
In scientifically sophisticated contemporary America, it is more than a
little unfashionable to assert a privileged access to material truths based on
one's reading of a sacred text, unless the text is sacred because reputable
scientists have so pronounced it. If, however, the sacred character of the
text flows from its role in one's religious faith, the widespread expectation is
that the text will at best be used to discover moral truth - and even that is
usually said to be acceptable as long as the reader does not try to "impose"
that truth on anybody else. But to use one's sacred text as the index to
truths about the material world is to lurch toward the lunatic fringe - the
lunatics, in this case, being those who use their understanding of God's word
to deny any of the teachings of modem natural science.
The conflict between religion and science is as old as human history and
American courts have rarely been much good at resolving it. I will not labor
here the long, difficult history of the judicial effort to cope with restrictions
on the teaching of evolution in public schools, for I have discussed those
cases in detail elsewhere.35 Still, a brief consideration of the battle over so-
called equal time statutes,36 which require the teaching of scientific creation-
ism alongside the teaching of evolution, is a useful method for understanding
the way in which the separation of church and self creates pressures for what
might be called "epistemic correctness" - that is, pressure by the state on
its citizens to adhere to a particular way of discovering facts about the
world.3?
33. The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofPow-
ers ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONGo REC. 10194 (1981).
34. See Stephen Galeback, A Human Life Statute, HUM. LIFE REV. (Winter 1981). For
academic criticism, see Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Re-
flections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 413-38 (1982).
35. See Carter, Religion as a Hobby, supra note 8, at 977-84 (describing the controversy
over statutes requiring students in public schools to study scientific creationism alongside
evolution).
36. See. e.g., Edwards V. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (holding statute that requir-
ing equal time for different subject matter was unconstitutional).
37. Cf Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case ofEpistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1990). Elsewhere, I have discussed the way that the Supreme Court's current vision of
the protections of the first amendment seems to encourage the state to try to align the episte-
mologies of its constituents. See Carter, supra note 16, at 891.
HeinOnline -- 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 593 1992-1993
1992] SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND SELF 593
Consider the way that the constitutional case against the teaching of crea-
tionism has always rested on the scientific case against it,38 which I have
described as a perhaps inevitable course, but a profoundly mistaken one.39
After all, epistemology sometimes reflects religious conviction, for religious
conviction may move people to decide, quite sincerely, whether to accept or
reject both moral and factual propositions. To the biblical literalist who be-
lieves in creationism, the most telling evidence against evolution theory is
not the complexity of the fossil record or the troubling matter of falsification,
but the beginning of the Book of Genesis, comprising, as one creationist has
written, "eleven chapters of straightforward Bible history which cannot be
reinterpreted in any satisfactory way."40
Critics of creationism often miss the epistemic conflict, for they fail to
understand that the creationist rejection of the evolution theory rests on a
nontrivial hermeneutic and a rational application of it to the evidence -
although, obviously, creationists dispute what counts as evidence. As Loren
Graham, a prominent historian of science, has noted, there have always been
charges by critics of "the epistemological bases of science"41 that science "is,
at best, so specialized that it misses the most significant modes of reality,
and, at worst, fundamentally alienating to the human spirit."42 Graham is
no fan of creationism, but he recognizes it for what it is: a part of a larger
movement toward "alternative modes of cognition."43
In this sense, the creationist position is less a mindless effort to get the
state to proselytize than part of a much larger argument in American culture
over how to determine truths about the natural world - an argument in
which, for example, feminist theory and critical race theory both play their
parts. Creationism rests centrally on a claim about what counts as author-
ity, a claim that has been central to the fundamentalist movement in Ameri-
can Christianity for decades. As one observer has written, "The emphasis
on biblical inerrancy, so puzzling to liberals, was at least in part a rational
search for a form of authority strong enough to resist encroachments on
traditional doctrine by liberal and modem ideas."44
Thus, the rejection of creationism exemplifies the separation of church
and self because the rhetorical form of that rejection is that creationists are
foolish for believing as they do, and would, perhaps, be better citizens if they
believed something else. Yet there is an important difference, one that our
secularized culture tends to miss, between the claim that creationism is
wrong and the claim that it is irrational. It is wrong - it is shoddy analysis
of shaky data - but that analysis and, that data, are only part of its source.
To the extent that creationism is the result of the application of the herme-
38. Edwards, 482 U.S. 578,634 (1987).
39. This point, like some of the discussion which follows, is anticipated in Carter, Religion
as a Hobby, supra note 8, at 984.
40. D. WATSON, THE GREAT BRAIN ROBBERY 46 (1976).
41. LOREN R. GRAHAM, BETWEEN SCIENCE AND VALUES 312 (1991).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 313-14.
44. E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 214 (1991).
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neutic of inerrancy to the opening chapters of Genesis, it is certainly ra-
tional. The trouble is simply that its essential axiom - literal inerrancy -
is not one that is widely shared. Thus the wrongness of creationism becomes
a matter of power: yes, it is wrong because proved wrong, but it is proved
wrong only in a particular epistemological universe. Even within the episte-
mology of natural science, there is no way to disprove, for example, the old
creationist claim that physical evidence against the biblical account is only a
trap set by the devil for the unwary.4S (One is reminded of the scene in one
of Douglas Adams's comic science fiction novels, when one of the alien be-
ings assigned to build the Earth mutters apologetically, "It's only half com-
pleted, I'm afraid - we haven't even finished burying the artificial dinosaur
skeletons in the crust yet"46). To say that the creationism battle is ulti-
mately over epistemology, not religion, is not to defend the so-called "equal
time" statutes, but only to say that those who demand them are not irra-
tional or fanatical. They are merely wrong.
For much the same reason, it is wrong to suggest that the "equal time"
statutes necessarily officially represent authorized proselytizing. Although
it is common to treat the creationism battle as an effort to impose religious
beliefs on others, this is not the only possible explanation, and it may not be
the most plausible one. More likely, the parents are frightened of the con-
flict between religious authority on the one hand, and the authority of secu-
lar society - as represented by the public schools - on the other. Parents
who want scientific creationism taught in schools do not share the view that
they are asking the schools to teach their religious beliefs. Their view is that
they are asking the school to teach the truth - not the moral truth with
which religion is commonly associated in our dialogue, but a truth about the
material world. In this sense, their battle is not with the courts or with the
First Amendment, but with the experts who insist on teaching children an
account of creation and evolution that the parents believe to be fraught with
factual errors.
Objections to the role of professed expertise in finding truth, when it con-
flicts with the central tenet of one's system, are common, and they are hardly
limited to the scientific creationists. Consider, for example, those who cher-
ish the market theory of value. If one considers value properly measured by
the prices of goods and services in a market, it is easy to understand the
wrath that is directed at government regulation seen as distorting the mar-
ket. Take the idea of "comparable worth"47 - the notion that experts can
study the nature of a task, compare it with other tasks, and decide whether
the market has valued it properly. Outside of committed advocates, one can
find few economists who take the idea of comparable worth seriously. The
45. For a witty effort at logical debunking of this once-common creationist claim, see
MARTIN GARDNER, SCIENCE: GOOD, BAD, AND BOGUS (1981).
46. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 174 (1981).
47. See County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981) (stating the theory of comparable
worth but deciding case on other grounds). For an in-depth discussion of the comparable
worth theory and its application, see Carin A. Clauss, Comparable Worth - The Theory, Its
Legal Foundation and the Feasibility ofImplementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7 (1986).
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late Clarence Pendleton, head of the United States Civil Rights Commission,
was roundly attacked for his reference to comparable worth as "the looniest
idea since Looney Tunes came on the screen."48 But his rhetoric was not
appreciably different from the way in which, for example, pro-choice forces
refer to efforts by self-proclaimed experts to determine the point at which
human life begins. There, too, one can scarcely find scientific experts who
are not opponents of abortion rights but who nevertheless believe that
human life begins at conception - and those who do are blasted for their
assertedly unscientific approach.
Nobody, it turns out, much likes to defer to experts whose judgments
might interfere with the ability to follow the call of one's most cherished
value. Ordinarily, people who refuse to let the experts have their say are not
dismissed as kooks. No one thinks that pro-choice forces are irrational be-
cause they do not consider the definition of human life a scientific question;
no one argues that free-market economists are crazy because they think that
the value of a service is the price that the market assigns. It is only when the
claim interposed against expertise is of a religious nature that the specter of
irrationality rears its head. So if, for example, parents who believe in the
literal inerrancy of the account of creation in the opening chapters of Gene-
sis refuse to let their children learn what the self-proclaimed experts say is
the better answer, they are derided in terms strongly suggesting that they are
fanatics, and quite out of their heads besides.
Because we do not usually consider people crazy or fanatical just because
they refuse to accept the counsel of scientific experts, the reason for the ver-
bal assaults on the parents who believe in creationism cannot be their rejec-
tion of scientific method. The one thing that distinguishes the creationist
parents from other dissenters from expert advice is the ground on which they
make their rejection. Parents who accept the Genesis account of creation
are motivated by their religious faith - and that motivation, evidently,
makes all the difference.
It is possible, of course, to hold the teaching of creationism unconstitu-
tional without worrying about parental motivation. After all, whatever the
controversy among legal scholars on the proper interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment,49 there is broad agreement that
the government cannot endorse a particular religious belief, and the teaching
of creationism alongside the theory of evolution does indeed seem to consti-
tute such an endorsement. (I do not believe that teaching about creationism
in a comparative religion or social studies course would constitute such an
endorsement, and there is probably a way to teach about creationism, and
others among Graham's "alternative modes of cognition," even in a science
classroom without endorsing them). But whatever the legal status of efforts
to teach scientific creationism in the classroom, it is terribly troubling to see
48. Statement of Clarence M. Pendleton, Chairman of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, at a news conference, Nov. 17, 1984, as reported in AP, Concept ofPay Based on
Worth is the 'Looniest' Rights Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1984, at 15.
49. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
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what a vast rhetorical difference religious motivation makes. For the rhetor-
ical case against the creationist parents rests not merely or mostly on arcane
questions of constitutional interpretation; the case rests principally on the
sense that the parents themselves are wrong to rely on their sacred text to
discover truths about the material world. The public school classroom, it
turns out, is a part of the public square, and students must separate their
civic from their religious selves if they hope to find welcome there.
III. PROBLEM 3 - OFFICIALLY DISAPPROVED
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
The separation of church and self also operates outside of the public
square. It operates in a realm one might have thought sacred - the practice
of religion, explicitly protected under the Free Exercise Clause.50 Indeed, so
thoroughly has the vision of religious choice as being essentially arbitrary
invaded the legal culture, that the lesson of recent Supreme Court decisions
on free exercise arguments seems to be this: If your religious practices are
inconsistent with a state policy - almost any state policy - you should
choose a new set of practices because the state will not be required to yield.
One might think that here, at the level of religious practice, the Free Exer-
cise Clause would have its most direct application, for it is hard to imagine
what other purpose the Clause could have. In recent decades, however, the
Supreme Court has not seemed particularly impressed by free exercise
claims. True, the Old Order Amish won a rather spectacular victory when
in Wisconsin v. Yoder 51 the Justices allowed them to cease sending their chil-
dren to school after the eighth grade.52 And then there is the challenging
line of cases that began with Sherbert v. Verner 53 wherein the Justices ruled
that if an employer refuses to accommodate the religious needs of an em-
ployee and the employee is subsequently dismissed, the state cannot deny
unemployment compensation.54
Sherbert, of course, is an analytical puzzle. It is not a bad ruling if one
happens to have a religious objection to one's job; but it is not so easy an
outcome to defend, either. The state should not treat employees who quit
their jobs for religious reasons any worse than it treats those who quit for
50. Id.
51. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
52. Id. at 234 (Court held that state could not compel "respondents to cause their chil-
dren to attend formal high school to age 16").
53. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54. Id. at 403-06; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 138-46
(1987) (reversing Florida court's denial of unemployment compensation to claimant dis-
charged for refusal to work on her Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (reversing Indiana court's denial of unemployment compen-
sation to claimant who terminated job because of religious beliefs against production of arma-
ments); Auslin v. Berryman, 862 F.2d 1050, 1051 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that Virginia statute
denying unemployment compensation to claimant who resigned to relocate with spouse vio-
lated First Amendment right to free exercise of religion); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 22, 24
(W.O. Ky. 1975) (holding that Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission's denial of
unemployment compensation to claimant who terminated job with tobacco manufacturer
under compulsion of church doctrine violated rights to free exercise of religion).
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other reasons, but what part of the Free Exercise Clause says that the state
must treat them better? A state could choose to adopt a reasonable accom-
modation requirement as part of its anti-discrimination laws, and some
states have done SO.55 SO has the federal government.56 If, however, the
Constitution mandates such a provision, then surely Employment Division
Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith 57 is wrongly decided.
Smith is a much criticized - and justly criticized - decision,58 and it
shows as clearly as one might like just where the current Court's free exer-
cise jurisprudence is heading: toward a clear separation of church and self, a
world in which citizens who adopt religious practices at variance with offi-
cial state policy are properly made subject to the coercive authority of the
state, which can pressure them to change those practices. The case involved
the dismissal of two state employees who had violated policy by using a
controlled substance, peyote. The employees protested that the Free Exer-
cise Clause was a shield, because they had used peyote as part of a religious
ritual. The majority scoffed at this claim, not so much disbelieving it as
disregarding it.59 The fact that the peyote use had religious significance, the
Court said, was irrelevant as long as the state law was not "an attempt to
regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the rais-
ing of one's children in those beliefs"60 - which, plainly, it was not.61
The Smith majority lamented that insisting on a heightened standard of
review for statutes interfering with religious practices "would open the pros-
55. See, e.g., Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.030(5)
(MichielBobbs-Merrill 1991); Massachusetts Unlawful Termination Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 151B, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1992); Ohio Civil Rights Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(Baldwin 1992); Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (1991);
Tennessee Human Rights Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (1991).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 20003(j) (West 1981).
57. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
58. See e.g., Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.R.I. 1992) (quoting B1ackmun, J.,
dissenting in Smith and concluding "free exercise of religion" is a 'luxury' ... and that repres-
sion of minority religions is an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government"); G.
Signey Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 949, 981
(1991) (asserting that the trend towards a more lenient rational basis standard of review endan-
gers individual rights); James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 91 (1991) (concluding that the Smith Court "mistreated precedent" and used "shoddy
reasoning"); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 5, 27 (1992) (arguing that the rational basis standard of review leaves those
acting out of religious conscience unprotected); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114-27 (1990) (criticizing the Smith
Court for misreading the Free Exercise Clause and misusing historical context and precedent);
Martha Minow, The Free Exercise ofFamilies, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 926-27 (1991) (con-
trasting the Court's increased tolerance for mainstream religious displays with an unwilling-
ness to protect practices of minority religions); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall ofReligious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149,231 (1991) (concluding that in
response to confusion surrounding the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's discussion in Smith
shows a virtual abandonment of protection of religious freedom); Tom Stacy, Death ofPrivacy,
and the Free Exercise ofReligion, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 490, 559 n.50 (1992) (stating that the
Court's decision in Smith is simply wrong because it reduces the Free Exercise Clause to
merely a protection against deliberate government religious discrimination).
59. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-82.
60. Id. at 882.
61. Id
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pect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind."62 One can understand the Court's worry
about how to stay off of the slippery slope - If peyote, why not cocaine? If
the Native American Church, why not The Matchbook Cover Church of the
Holy Peyote Plant? - but the implications of the decision are unsettling. If
the state bears no special burden to justify its infringement on religious prac-
tice, as long as the challenged statute is a neutral one, then the only protec-
tion a religious group receives is against legislation directed at that group.
But legislation directed at a particular religious group, even in the absence of
the Free Exercise Clause, would presumably be prohibited by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Smith is part of a recent and unfortunate line of cases that
reduce the scope of the Free Exercise Clause until it lacks independent con-
tent, forbidding by its own force no more than do the document's other
clauses that protect individual rights (here, equal protection, in other cases,
free speech or assembly).
Indeed, Justice Scalia's focus in his majority opinion on the ability to com-
municate religious beliefs, whether to others or to one's progeny,63 fits the
traditional free speech model so snugly that one can assume that those pro-
tections would be available even if there were no Free Exercise Clause. The
vision of the Clause as protecting acts of communication rather than acts of
worship or public acts carries with it precisely the message that the separa-
tion of church and self entails: you are free to believe as you like, but, for
goodness sake, don't act on it!
Now, one will not find many serious scholars of the Free Exercise Clause
who think Smith is convincingly reasoned, and it seems inconsistent with
Sherbert. 64 It is, however, the law of the land, and likely to stay that way,
for both Sherbert and Yoder seem increasingly shaky.6s The Justices have
refused to extend Yoder-type protections to any other group, or, for the
Amish, to any other activity. As for Sherbert, the Justices recently warned,
in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,66 that the protec-
tion of religiously-based refusals to work might vanish if "Sunday shopping,
or Sunday sporting, for that matter, [would] grind to a halt."67 In fact, the
Court's recent cases, Smith very much to the fore, point toward a free exer-
cise jurisprudence that will more and more resemble the jurisprudence of
free speech.68
Surely the Free Exercise Clause,69 like every provision of the Constitution,
should be read to have independent substantive content. But apart from a
handful of peculiar cases,70 the Court has not read the Free Exercise Clause
62. [d. at 879-82.
63. [d. at 882.
64. See text accompanying supra notes 53-56.
65. See text accompanying supra notes 51-56.
66. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
67. [d. at 835.
68. See generally, Carter, Does the First Amendment Pratect More Than Free Speech?,
supra note 19, at 4.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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to protect much more than the Free Speech Clause protects. In other words,
outside the strangely chosen context of unemployment compensation, and
one case - one only - favoring the special rights of the Old Order Amish
not to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade, the Justices
have generally supported free exercise claims only when they are nearly
identical to free speech claims that might be made on the same sets of facts.
No wonder the Justices showed such little sympathy for the Indian tribes
who challenged the Forest Service's decision to allow harvesting in an area
used by the tribes for sacred rituals. The Court's response in Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Association 71 very much smacked of Oh,
really? True, the Justices said, allowing the harvesting and road building
might have "devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices,"72
but "government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires."73 Again, the Court's fear seems to be
the slippery slope. After all, were the Court to force the Forest Service to
take account of the Indians' religious practices, thus enabling them to block
the road, goodness knows who might be next. Hunters, maybe. Sunday
sailors - or maybe the Sunday shoppers who so concerned the Justices in
Frazee. 74 Maybe even (gasp!) environmentalists.7s
Of course, none of these groups would have the Free Exercise Clause to
support their claims. And it might seem logical to say that since the relig-
iously devout have, under the Free Exercise Clause, a right that other groups
lack, it is perfectly reasonable to give them special treatment that other
groups do not receive. This, after all, is what the Supreme Court has done in
the puzzling line of cases set off by Sherbert v. Verner. 76 But those cases, as I
have indicated, seem to be reaching their end.
The whimpering conclusion seems to be this: if the state seeks to enforce a
policy that is not aimed at a religious practice but effectively prohibits it, the
state wins. Some might argue that this rule is only fair because the Estab-
lishment Clause does not allow the granting of special privileges based on
religion. That reading of the Establishment Clause, however, reads the Free
Exercise Clause out of the First Amendment - a terrifying result, but one
that is consistent with, and perhaps even mandated by, the separation of
church and self.
IV. CONCLUSION
I do not fully have answers to all these questions. I do not, for example,
have a doctrinal solution to enforcing the Establishment Clause in a way
that gives more breathing space to the Free Exercise Clause. I am certain,
however, that finding the right doctrinal solution is a crucial task for theory.
71. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
72. Id. at 451.
73. Id. at 452.
74. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989).
75. For effective criticism of Lyng, see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in
Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992).
76. See cases cited supra note 54.
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Crucial, but also incomplete - for the separation of church and self, far
more than a legal doctrine, has become a conversational habit in the liberal
state. The danger, then, is that what was once an esoteric classroom theory
is now a guiding principle of our political culture.
Yet the separation of church and state, a metaphor essential to the work-
ing of American democracy, does not require a separation of church and
self. Neither does the ideal of pluralist democracy. Possibly the leading the-
orists of liberalism do not even intend one. But they too often write as
though they do, and the courts do the same. The result is a legal culture,
and, increasingly, a political one, in which citizens whose moral conclusions
are formed through important reference to their religious understandings are
not welcomed, and indeed, are condemned as illiberal.
This cannot - this must not - be the state to which our liberal democ-
racy falls, because if we allow it, then, far from cherishing religious belief, we
are trivializing and discouraging it. We are, in effect (and sometimes in so
many words), telling the religiously devout that religious belief is aberra-
tional and arbitrary and essentially undemocratic.
We must, as a legal and political culture, find ways to welcome the relig-
iously devout rather than shutting them out of the dialogue that liberal de-
mocracy requires. We must not force them to split off a portion of
themselves; we must, therefore, reject the separation of church and self.
